‘While the externalisation of terrorism through high-impact, war-like response is necessary, the caveat here is that it may end up distracting us from the primary goal — terrorism in J&K’
| Photo Credit: THE HINDU/IMRAN NISSAR
The Pahalgam terror strike, on April 22, perpetrated by Pakistan proxies, and India’s retribution through Operation Sindoor, on May 7, have fundamentally altered the security landscape of the region. While Operation Sindoor represents an undeniable tactical and operational success, its strategic efficacy in diminishing the long-term terrorist threat remains uncertain. At present, the discourses across all the forums in the country, unfortunately centre exclusively on matters of foreign policy and the external application of military force. The aspects concerning internalisation of terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) have often been given a miss, thereby missing the wood for the trees. Here, it is crucial to understand that in the overall context, it has always been about winning Kashmir rather than defeating Pakistan.
The complex reality of terrorism in J&K
It is beyond any doubt that Pakistan bears substantial accountability for the security situation in J&K, since Independence. After exploding in 1989, the security landscape was transformed from predominantly indigenous insurgency to significant participation of foreign terrorists, around the mid-1990s. Notwithstanding the foreign terrorists, a long-term analyses of patterns of terrorism reveal that local dynamics related to identity, marginalisation, repression and political disenfranchisement have played pivotal roles. These factors have given Pakistan the fuel to foment trouble. The interplay between external sponsorship and internal vulnerabilities creates a complex ecosystem of terrorism that defies simplistic military solutions, internally or externally.
Since 1989, the security forces have achieved substantial progress in J&K. As in South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data, overall fatalities have reduced from over 4,000 lives in 2001 to 127 in 2024. This achievement stems from the consolidation of the security grid, the government’s outreach to local populations and Pakistan’s diminishing capacity to wage a high-intensity proxy war. This positive trajectory suggests that India’s multifaceted approach has yielded tangible results, even as significant challenges remain and more needs to be done in the context.
Deterring Pakistan
Analysing terror-related fatalities in J&K over the last decade shows that kinetic actions such as surgical strikes (2016) and the Balakot aerial strike (2019) have not deterred Pakistan. SATP data show that fatalities went up to 267 in 2016 from 175 in 2015 and continued to rise through 2019. Even after the Kargil victory (1999), terror indices in the region shot up to an all time high. In Operation Sindoor, although our military actions ascended several notches above the surgical strikes or Balakot, these may still not deter Pakistan.
The government of Pakistan and the Pakistani people claim that they won the 100 hours war, from May 7 to 10. Pakistan’s General Asim Munir has been elevated to the rank of Field Marshal and according to Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani political scientist, military nationalism has been revived in Pakistan. Deterring Pakistan in the present circumstances seems ambitious.
The participation of local terrorists in J&K, at present, is very low in contrast to the Burhan Wani days. Even though foreign terrorists are now technologically savvy and are relatively less dependent on local terrorists, the role played by local terrorists cannot be underestimated. Amid heightened security concerns following the Pahalgam attack, intelligence agencies have identified scores of local terrorists with links to their foreign counterparts.
The voids in the security grid in the Jammu region, caused by troops being moved to Galwan, were exploited by terrorist cadres in new groups such as The Resistance Front, the People’s Anti-Fascist Front, and the Kashmir Tigers, to name a few. The deteriorating security situation in the Jammu region has been marked by a kill ratio that favours the terrorists. What is worrying is the prevalent degree of local support for the terrorists. Human intelligence, or HUMINT, seems to have dried up, which explains the sustenance of terrorists (this includes the perpetrators of Pahalgam, who continue to be at large).
Beyond kinetic operations
The bipartisan support of the local population in J&K against the Pahalgam massacre was spontaneous and unprecedented. Such a swell in support presents us with a strategic opportunity that must be consolidated rather than squandered through counterproductive measures such as demolishing the houses of alleged terrorists or mass arrests.
While the externalisation of terrorism through high-impact, war-like response is necessary, the caveat here is that it may end up distracting us from the primary goal — terrorism in J&K. Expert commentary following Operation Sindoor suggests a concerning tendency to oversimplify the complex challenge of terrorism in J&K, potentially numbing policymakers to harder questions regarding terrorism and its roots in both external sponsorship and internal grievances.
Operation Sindoor has demonstrated India’s growing prowess in kinetic non-contact warfare, but this must be complemented by non-kinetic tools to establish a more effective deterrent against Pakistan. Most critical is to contextualise the multidimensional approach to the internal dynamics, where the fundamental principle of ‘people as the centre of gravity’ is the driving force. Sustained political engagement, economic development and social integration, complemented by security-centric measures, can complete the picture. Deterrence can materialise only through an in-depth approach that is backed by our national resolve.
Shashank Ranjan is a retired Indian Army colonel with substantial experience of serving in a counter-terrorism environment. He currently teaches at the O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonepat, Haryana
Published – May 24, 2025 12:08 am IST