Sectarian wounds: on the violence in Syria

Last week’s violence in southern Syria, which saw the killing of hundreds from the Druze community, was a grave reminder of the country’s deep-rooted sectarian tensions, now ruled by a former Sunni jihadist. When the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS), formerly an al-Qaeda affiliate, captured power in Syria in November 2024, its leader Ahmed al Sharaa (who until recently was known as Abu Mohammed al-Jolani) pledged to protect the rights of all communities. But the realities on the ground tell a different story. Syria is approximately 80% Sunni, with minorities including Alawites, Shias, Christians and Druze making up the rest. The ascent of the HTS triggered widespread anxiety among these groups. These fears were only reinforced when violence erupted against the Alawites, the sect of former President Bashar al-Assad, in March in the western coastal region. Hundreds were killed in days long attacks orchestrated by pro-government militias, most of them jihadists. It took only four months before the next atrocity unfolded — this time in Sweida, a Druze heartland in the south. Clashes initially broke out between Druze and local Bedouin members, which prompted Mr. Sharaa to send in security forces. What followed was a massacre.

The sectarian violence escalated into a regional crisis after Israel began bombing Syrian government forces and military infrastructure in Sweida and Damascus. While Israel does have a Druze minority of its own, its claims of humanitarian intervention ring hollow in the context of its ongoing genocidal war on Gaza. Israel has long conducted strikes in Syria — earlier, its targets were Hezbollah and Mr. Assad’s troops. Now that the HTS is in power, Tel Aviv does not want a consolidated Syrian military presence near its border. These internal and external pressures have left Mr. Sharaa vulnerable. Syria, which witnessed coups and counter-coups in the 1950s and 1960s, achieved some stability under the secular Baathist rule in the 1970s. When the Baathist regime became a dynastic dictatorship, cracks began to emerge in the political and social consensus that Hafez al-Assad, Bashar’s father, had built, to culminate in a devastating civil war. The best chance for Mr. Sharaa to redeem himself and Syria was to rebuild a pluralistic state, with Kurds, Alawites, Christians and Druze enjoying equal rights. Instead, his push to establish a centralised Islamist regime in Damascus has deepened the sectarian wounds. And the HTS’s armed jihadists, who go on killing sprees against minority dissenters, are pushing the country towards disintegration. Unless Mr. Sharaa takes urgent steps to rein in his fighters and rebuild a national consensus, Syria risks descending deeper into chaos.