Fix the flaws: On Rahul Gandhi’s ‘stolen elections’ allegation and the Election Commission of India

The Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, Rahul Gandhi, has levelled serious allegations of “criminal fraud” against the Election Commission of India (ECI), by claiming that over 1 lakh fake votes were created in the Mahadevapura Assembly segment of the Bangalore Central Lok Sabha constituency in order to ensure a victory for the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the 2024 general election. His detailed presentation outlining five categories of alleged electoral malpractices demands careful examination, not wholesale dismissal. The Congress leader’s documentation reveals troubling patterns: voters registered multiple times within the same constituency, identical Electors Photo Identity Card (EPIC) numbers across different States, and improbably large numbers of voters listed at single addresses. While identical EPIC numbers across different States are not a significant issue — the ECI addressed these anomalies earlier this year — his claim that party workers found booth slips showing multiple votes by the “same person” in a single booth represents a serious violation of the “one person, one vote” principle, if verified. Mr. Gandhi claimed that these discrepancies were not limited to Mahadevapura but were part of a calculated modus operandi to help the BJP in marginal constituencies across the country. The Congress party had made similar allegations about massive increases in electoral registrations prior to the Maharashtra Assembly election, claiming that these had contributed to the unexpected victory of the BJP and its allies, though without elaborate proof of erroneous registrations as seen in Mahadevapura. Mr. Gandhi’s analysis stops short of proving that these discrepancies directly enabled the BJP’s victory. The BJP won the Mahadevapura Assembly seat in 2023 with a margin of approximately 44,500 votes. The increased margin, to over 1,14,000 votes, in 2024 happened even though the total accretions in the electoral roll were around 52,600 electors and the actual voter count increased only by around 20,000. Establishing a causal link between electoral roll errors and poll outcomes requires more than circumstantial correlation. The leap from documenting registration flaws to alleging deliberate fraud orchestrated by the ECI in collusion with the BJP remains unsubstantiated.

The ECI has adopted an unnecessarily defensive stance by demanding that evidence be submitted ‘under oath’ — a requirement that legal experts suggest may not apply in this situation — and attributing electoral discrepancies to the failure by political parties to raise concerns during registration. More problematic is the ECI’s practice of releasing voter information in bulky image PDFs rather than structured, searchable text formats, which hinders verification efforts by political parties and civil society organisations. The ECI’s approach to voter registration relies heavily on self-declarations and lacks robust verification mechanisms. The Mahadevapura controversy highlights the urgent need for comprehensive electoral roll reform through door-to-door verification, the most reliable method. The ECI’s Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise in Bihar appears to respond to critics about electoral roll problems. In theory, this should help maintain more accurate rolls. However, rushed implementation and problematic identity verification requirements risk creating new issues related to legitimate voter deletion. Data already show higher deletions among women electors than men in Bihar. Considering that most out-migrants are males, the higher deletion of women electors could indicate that marginalised electors — particularly those who are illiterate (literacy rate of women aged 15-49 years in Bihar was 55% in 2019-21, according to the National Family Health Survey) — have been erroneously excluded in the enumeration process for the draft SIR roll.

The broader challenge extends to multiple aspects of electoral administration: lax implementation of campaign finance regulations and the Model Code of Conduct, tallying VVPATs from only small samples rather than statistically significant proportions, inadequate technical safeguards for symbol loading in VVPATs, and the unwillingness to submit the EVM’s technical safeguards to independent expert verification. The ECI’s resistance to retaining CCTV footage from polling booths, delays in publishing final turnout figures, and evolution into an institution viewing criticism as an attack represent a troubling departure from democratic norms. The fundamental issue underlying current electoral controversies is the erosion of institutional trust. The ECI’s credibility depends not merely on technical soundness but also on public confidence in its impartiality and transparency. The process of appointing Election Commissioners needs to follow the Supreme Court’s recommendation to include the Chief Justice of India in the selection panel, currently side-stepped by the government. Mr. Gandhi’s allegations fall short of establishing deliberate fraud. But his party’s findings perform a valuable democratic function by highlighting systemic flaws. The appropriate response requires comprehensive voter roll auditing, enhanced transparency in data sharing, improved technical safeguards including comprehensive audit trails of EVM commands and security protocols for symbol loading, stronger enforcement of electoral regulations, and consultations with political parties. The ECI must embrace the principle that democratic institutions grow stronger through scrutiny. The alternative — continued erosion of confidence in electoral processes — poses far greater risks to democratic governance than any specific allegation of malpractice.

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