For more than a decade, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has not merely dominated Indian politics. It has reshaped it. The party governs 15 States and Union Territories, shares power with allies in six more, and wields the machinery of the Union government even in regions beyond its direct control. Its ascent rested on a potent mix of cultural assertiveness, institutional dominance and muscular nationalism, projecting an aura of invincibility that elevated its rule beyond ordinary electoral success into the realm of political hegemony. But that is beginning to change. The BJP remains electorally formidable and is still the dominant party. Yet, its ability to dominate common sense, dictate the terms of public debate and mute opposition is beginning to show cracks. Recent developments suggest that the once-unassailable dominance of the BJP is facing its most serious challenge in a decade. It has squandered the dominance — even the hegemony — it once enjoyed, a decline now intertwined with the political challenge it confronts as it approaches the Bihar Assembly election later this year.
An eroding narrative supremacy
Its political project built around Hindutva, national pride and majoritarian identity long helped mask economic underperformance, deepening inequality and extreme concentration of wealth in the hands of a few who now exert outsized influence over public policy. The emotional returns of Hindutva were allowed to stand in for material improvements. That trade-off is losing its grip. Youth unemployment remains high, wage growth is stagnant and the informal sector continues to reel from the aftershocks of demonetisation, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Goods and Services Tax (GST). For growing sections of the population, the promise of jobs and upward mobility is beginning to outweigh symbolic victories. And in that widening gap between rhetoric and reality, the party’s narrative supremacy is beginning to slip.
The appeal to the urban middle class rested not only on Hindu nationalism but also on the promise of international recognition — an India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, as a globally respected power. Diplomatic visibility, high-profile summits and a carefully curated image of global stature were projected as markers of national progress. But that narrative has lost momentum, particularly after tensions with the United States over President Donald Trump’s claim of brokering a ceasefire following the India-Pakistan conflict sparked by the Pahalgam terror attack in April 2025. The tariff war with Washington, which has triggered job losses across several sectors, alongside the collapse of trade talks and tighter visa regimes, has further punctured the illusion of a seamless global ascent. For India’s middle class and media, once buoyed by the rhetoric of global rise and the self-proclaimed role of Vishwa Guru, the hard edges of realpolitik have begun to temper enthusiasm and puncture the earlier sense of triumphalism.
One area where the party continues to hold strong appeal, particularly among rural voters and the urban poor, is its system of Direct Benefit Transfers (DBT). Schemes such as Pradhan Mantri Kisan Samman Nidhi or PM-KISAN, Pradhan Mantri Jan-Dhan Yojana, Mukhya Mantri Ladli Behna Yojana, and other targeted programmes deliver tangible material benefits. In a context of economic insecurity and widespread deprivation, this helps blunt public discontent. It also helps explain the paradox of the BJP’s sustained electoral competitiveness, even as its hegemonic architecture shows signs of strain. Yet, welfare delivery alone cannot sustain political dominance. This is why the regime persistently curbs dissent, silences opposition, and incarcerates critics, activists and intellectuals — not merely to neutralise political rivals, but to suppress independent voices that question its legitimacy.
A more coordinated Opposition
Perhaps the most intangible, yet revealing, sign of change is this: people, especially Opposition leaders, are no longer afraid. Fear once defined the ecosystem of control — fear of arrest, harassment, or marginalisation. That atmosphere has begun to thin. The Opposition is now not only more coordinated but also more assertive, carving out space and placing the government under sustained scrutiny. Yet, challenges remain. The INDIA alliance must still navigate complex regional and ideological differences. But to focus only on those hurdles is to miss the larger shift: the Opposition is no longer a passive critic of government policy. It is actively working to redefine the political agenda. As a result, the cracks in the ruling dispensation’s dominance have widened, most visibly in Parliament. Both the Budget and Monsoon sessions saw a combative Opposition taking on the government across multiple political and policy fronts, often to the ruling party’s visible discomfort. The ‘Gujarat model’ — suspending the entire Opposition and pushing Bills through without debate — is no longer proving effective. A more united Opposition has now cornered the government on key issues such as the caste census, Operation Sindoor, the Special Intensive Revision scheme of the Bihar electoral rolls, and alleged election manipulation.
At the centre of this shift is the Congress, led by Rahul Gandhi. His Bharat Jodo Yatra (2022-23) marked a turning point, both for him and for the party. Since then, the Congress has regained momentum, even as the regime tried to cripple it by freezing its bank accounts on the eve of the 2024 general election. That move backfired. Rather than weakening the party, it exposed the government’s heavy-handedness and chipped away at the BJP’s aura of invincibility. Mr. Gandhi and his colleagues have managed to reframe the party’s image from a reactive opposition to a more proactive, agenda-setting force. The real test, however, lies ahead: turning that shift into sustained political action and significant electoral gains.
The regime’s push to tighten control over the Election Commission of India is a telling sign of its waning hegemony. Recent efforts to weaken judicial oversight and expand executive power — particularly through the CEC and Other Election Commissioners Bill, 2023 — reveal a deeper unease. The BJP is no longer willing to rely on existing rules unless it can reshape them in its favour. A government secure in its authority would have no need to rewrite the rules. The very impulse to do so signals a crisis of control — a fear that its dominance can no longer be taken for granted.
Perhaps the most damaging development for the regime has been the Congress-led campaign accusing it of systematically manipulating voter rolls. What might once have seemed like routine administrative irregularities has been reframed as a deliberate strategy to undermine democratic choice. By exposing patterns of mass deletions, rushed revisions and algorithmic targeting of Opposition-leaning demographics, the campaign has transformed technical disputes into a broader indictment of the regime’s integrity. Essentially, these charges go beyond questioning the fairness of individual elections, they challenge the legitimacy of the regime’s victories, suggesting that they stem not from genuine majority support but the manipulation of electoral processes.
The two parties, the crucial difference
Crucially, the BJP’s dominance is often compared to the post-Independence dominance of the Congress Party but the analogy obscures a fundamental difference. What distinguishes the current moment from earlier eras of single-party dominance is that it has not produced a “BJP system” in the way the Congress once created a “Congress system”. The Congress’s hegemony rested not just on electoral victories but also on its ability to absorb and reflect India’s diverse social, regional and ideological currents. Its dominance was underpinned by a broad consensus even when contested. In contrast, the BJP’s dominance is rooted in polarisation and exclusion, rather than accommodation and inclusion. Its power rests primarily on electoral success reinforced by state machinery, rather than on a deep reservoir of social legitimacy. And as soon as that machinery falters, the cracks begin to show.
Zoya Hasan is Professor Emerita, Centre for Political Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Published – September 10, 2025 12:16 am IST