Last week, China, Pakistan and Bangladesh held their first trilateral meeting in Kunming, China. The discussions focused on furthering cooperation and exploring the possibilities of deeper engagement. This meeting closely follows another trilateral meeting between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, held in May, with the aim of extending the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and increasing cooperation. These trilaterals, led by China, come at a time of Pakistan’s little relevance to the region, India’s increasing relations with Afghanistan, and New Delhi’s deteriorating ties with Bangladesh. The use of trilaterals underscores China’s fresh attempts at making Pakistan a stakeholder in the region and keeping New Delhi preoccupied with immediate concerns.
A war that shaped alignments
The 1962 war between India and China has largely shaped regional alignments and geopolitics. Following the war, China found Pakistan to be an ally that could keep India engaged with immediate threats and limit it from challenging Beijing’s interests, security, and status. On the other hand, Pakistan deemed China to be a country that would unquestionably offer economic and military assistance to support its aggression against India. To date, Pakistan is highly dependent on China for assistance, investments and infrastructure development. In fact, by the end of 2024, Pakistan had a loan of over $29 billion from China. It is estimated that over 80% of Pakistan’s arms imports are from China. In addition, China has also shielded Pakistan-backed terrorists at the United Nations Security Council and other multilateral platforms.
This camaraderie was largely visible during India’s Operation Sindoor in May 2025. China termed India’s retaliation to the Pakistan-sponsored attack in Pahalgam as “regrettable” and urged a political solution and dialogue. It backed Pakistan’s stance of initiating an investigation into the Pahalgam terror attack in April 2025. The latest escalation also saw Pakistan deploying various Chinese-made hardware and weapons that ranged from surveillance radars, drones, missiles, guidance systems, and fighter jets. In the immediate aftermath of Operation Sindoor, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister met his Chinese counterpart to reaffirm its “iron-clad friendship.” The trilateral with Afghanistan and other countries likely emerged from this meeting.
The resurfacing of an idea
This idea of China and Pakistan using plus one against India is not a new phenomenon. Even in 1965, Pakistan flirted with the idea of using East Pakistan, China and Nepal to cut off India from its strategic Siliguri corridor. This idea of using South Asian countries seems to have resurfaced as both China and Pakistan face a confident India. Pakistan-sponsored terror attacks in Uri (2016), Pulwama (2019), and Pahalgam have seen India retaliate in a befitting manner. It has shown that India will no longer tolerate Pakistan’s nuclear blackmail. India has also used its diplomatic clout and growing economy to isolate Pakistan. India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, halting trade, restricting port access, and targeting military installations — all as a part of its retaliatory measures against the Pahalgam attack — has damaged Pakistan military’s operational capacities and confidence, highlighting Rawalpindi’s limitations and weaknesses. India’s military and diplomatic responses to Chinese border intrusions in Doklam and Galwan have also likely taken Beijing by surprise. New Delhi has also increased close cooperation with like-minded countries to limit Chinese aggressions.
At the same time, India’s pragmatic engagement and domestic politics of the region have slowed down China’s momentum in South Asia. In the Maldives, Beijing appears reluctant to trust President Mohamed Muizzu and the country’s economy, despite his initial anti-India rhetoric. Mr. Muizzu has now turned to India to keep the country’s economy afloat. In Nepal, despite signing the framework for Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) cooperation, major differences in funding remain unresolved and the progress of projects has been slow. In Sri Lanka, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake is developing close ties with India by respecting its redlines. Despite ideological and historical differences with Delhi, he visited India before China. In the case of Bangladesh, despite differences, India has not hindered the trilateral energy cooperation with Nepal.
These increasing anxieties are likely to have motivated China to push for trilaterals with Afghanistan and Bangladesh. Before their respective regime changes in 2021 and 2024, both countries were staunch supporters of India’s fight against both Pakistan and its state-sponsored terrorism. With the change in regimes, however, Pakistan and China have attempted to draw both countries closer to their orbit. They remain cautious of pragmatic engagement between India and the Taliban, fearing that Pakistan would lose its leverage. At the same time, Pakistan has increased security, economic and political engagements with the new government in Bangladesh.
Historically, both Bangladesh and Afghanistan have enjoyed close ties with Pakistan and provide a fertile ground for cross-border terrorism. Pakistan’s influence, supported by China and its economic clout, could thus create new terror and security-related challenges. This will help Pakistan become a relevant country in the region, create rifts between India and its neighbours, and keep Delhi preoccupied with immediate security and terror-related challenges, making way for Chinese BRI projects, interests and investments in the region.
China efforts and setbacks
The developments in the region demonstrate, once again, that China, and not Pakistan, is India’s biggest challenge. With both Pakistan and China confronting a confident India, China sees an opportunity to challenge India through the trilateral nexus. At a time when India is seeking support from South Asian countries to fight terrorism, Chinese efforts will create new setbacks. South Asian countries will thus have to learn to balance between India and China, as Beijing uses Islamabad to create new complexities in the region. On its part, Delhi will have to continue to express redlines and convey the point that any misadventures by its neighbours could have severe economic, military, and political costs.
Harsh V. Pant is Vice-President, Observer Research Foundation. Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy is Associate Fellow, Neighbourhood Studies, Observer Research Foundation
Published – June 28, 2025 12:08 am IST