Over the past two decades, China has entrenched itself as a dominant actor in Africa’s mining sector. But signs are mounting that the tide is beginning to turn.
A new wave of resistance, driven by increased scrutiny from African governments as well as civil society activism, is starting to challenge China’s long-standing dominance in Africa’s mining industry. Chinese firms have often failed to deliver promised skills transfer or infrastructure. Consequently, African nations are growingly asserting their rights to value-added development. The old model of raw resource extraction in exchange for infrastructure or investments is no longer tenable in a region demanding agency, accountability, and economic sovereignty.
No longer passive partners
Africa is home to some of the world’s richest reserves of critical minerals. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) alone produces 80% of the world’s cobalt, a mineral indispensable for rechargeable batteries. China controls around 80% of that output through long-standing agreements such as the Sino Congolaise des Mines (Sicomines) deal, which granted Chinese firms mining rights in exchange for infrastructure projects. However, the benefits to local Congolese have been disproportionate to the mineral wealth extracted.
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According to the civil society coalition Congo Is Not for Sale (CNPAV), tax exemptions granted to Chinese companies cost the DRC approximately $132 million in 2024 alone. These losses have spurred public outrage, and citizens have called for a full review of the Sicomines deal. Further, since the payments are tied to market prices, there is a real risk that the country could receive little or no infrastructure investment during downturns.
Faced with mounting criticism, the Congolese government was forced to renegotiate the existing contracts with China, especially in light of fluctuating copper prices. The DRC reportedly plans to increase its stake in a joint venture with Chinese firms Sinohydro and China Railway Group, raising its ownership from 32% to 70%. Last year, after Congo’s state-owned miner, Gecamines, voiced its opposition, the sale of Trafigura-backed miner Chemaf Resources to China’s Norin Mining was cancelled. In Namibia, China’s Xinfeng Investments has been accused of acquiring its lithium mine through a bribe of N$ 50 million. Over the years, Xinfeng has exported thousands of tonnes of raw lithium ore to China but has not constructed the promised processing facilities. Workers at the company have also reported hazardous working conditions and substandard housing. In 2023, China’s Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt invested $300 million to construct a lithium processing plant in Zimbabwe. Most benefits will likely flow back to China unless robust regulatory frameworks and local capacity-building initiatives are implemented.
China’s dominance has also triggered environmental and social concerns. In Hwange National Park in Zimbabwe, Chinese firm Sunny Yi Feng’s application for coal mining permits has been blocked by environmental authorities. In Zambia, a catastrophic acid spill from a Chinese-owned copper mine contaminated a significant tributary of the Kafue River, one of the country’s most critical water sources. In Cameroon, resistance is growing against the massive Lobé-Kribi Iron Ore Project led by Sinosteel Cam S.A., a subsidiary of China’s Sinosteel Corporation. Local NGOs have warned that the project threatens ecosystems, public health, and cultural heritage. Many community members see the project as a fait accompli, pushed through without adequate consultation or benefit-sharing.
Across Africa, Beijing’s once-unquestioned mining dominance is now being scrutinised more closely, with a growing demand for fairer, more transparent partnerships. This signals a newfound assertiveness by African governments, who are no longer content to act as passive partners in resource exploitation.
Policy changes
Meanwhile, strategic policy changes are also occurring. In 2022, Zimbabwe banned the export of unprocessed lithium to force investors to build local processing plants. In 2023, Namibia implemented a similar export ban on unprocessed lithium and other critical minerals. These countries aim to retain more value from their mineral wealth by requiring local beneficiation. Similar stories are unfolding across the continent.
Still, policy alone is not enough. These export bans must match broader economic strategies to ensure local participation in processing and transformation. Otherwise, they risk simply shifting exploitation from one form to another. African leaders must ensure that domestic processing leads to fundamental economic transformation, not just a new phase of elite capture.
China may still be Africa’s largest mining partner, but the future of its dominance is no longer guaranteed. Moreover, a clear shift is underway, where African nations are reasserting sovereignty over their natural resources. By challenging opaque contracts, enforcing environmental standards, and demanding value addition, they are redrawing the terms of engagement. If these trends continue, African countries are poised to reshape the global supply chain for minerals and their role within it, moving from exporters of raw materials to integral partners in the emerging green economy. This change would come at the expense of China’s long-standing dominance in the African mining sector.
Samir Bhattacharya, Associate Fellow, Observer Research Foundation
Published – August 14, 2025 01:46 am IST