Are existing mechanisms effective in combating judicial corruption?

Is impeachment an effective mechanism for judicial accountability, given its reliance on political consensus?

Sanjay Hegde: Far from being a mechanism for accountability, the process of impeachment is designed to shield judges. Unless a motion garners the support of two-thirds of the members present and voting, as well as an absolute majority in each House of Parliament, the judges cannot be removed. To assume that the threat of impeachment acts as a deterrent is misguided, given how rarely such proceedings succeed. What is needed instead is an internal mechanism within the judiciary to transparently address serious misconduct. Such a system would go a long way in reinforcing public confidence in the institution.

Alok Prasanna Kumar: Impeachment upholds judicial independence by insulating judges from political retaliation. To this end, the process is intentionally rigorous, requiring both a detailed parliamentary procedure and proof of ‘misbehaviour or incapacity.’ These high thresholds are meant to deter the executive from using impeachment to remove judges who are seen as inconvenient.

We also tend to assume that judicial independence has always existed, but it is a relatively modern concept. Historically, judges served to deliver the monarch’s justice, not to check state power or protect individual rights. This began to change with the rise of constitutional democracies.

Are legislative reforms required in the Supreme Court’s in-house procedure for addressing judicial misconduct?

Sanjay Hegde: The in-house procedure was established to prevent the misuse of legal processes against the judiciary, especially when judicial decisions displease the executive. A key precedent is Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat (1991), where the Supreme Court intervened after the Chief Judicial Magistrate of Nadiad was mistreated by Gujarat police officials, and issued guidelines for arresting judicial officers. To guard against misuse, the judiciary introduced an internal inquiry mechanism before allowing prosecution. Nonetheless, this framework could benefit from legislative intervention.

Alok Prasanna Kumar: Corruption cases are particularly difficult to prosecute in a country like ours, where enforcement institutions are weak, the capacity to secure convictions is limited, and judges enjoy a degree of institutional protection. A striking example is the recent acquittal of former Punjab and Haryana High Court judge Nirmal Yadav, nearly 15 years after a Supreme Court-mandated inquiry committee found sufficient evidence to prosecute her. That said, I agree with Sanjay that there is certainly scope for strengthening the in-house procedure.

Should inquiry reports under this mechanism be made public?

Alok Prasanna Kumar: Yes. We have seen a welcome shift towards transparency in the Supreme Court’s handling of the Justice Yashwant Varma case. In an age where judicial conduct is closely scrutinised through social and mass media, opacity in cases of alleged judicial corruption is no longer viable. However, such transparency cannot remain an ad hoc response to crises; it must be institutionalised. At the same time, it is essential that the inquiry process upholds the principles of natural justice and safeguards the rights of the accused. While rigid procedural rules may not be feasible, a balanced framework is necessary — one that commands the confidence of all stakeholders and prevents the inquiry process from becoming the subject of further litigation.

Sanjay Hegde: I agree that increased transparency in the functioning of inquiry committees is welcome. However, in this particular case, the Court’s decision appears to have been shaped by the extraordinary level of public speculation. By proactively releasing the video purportedly showing the recovery of unaccounted cash, the Court pre-empted any perception that it was shielding a member of the higher judiciary. Had the footage surfaced through other unofficial channels, it could have severely undermined institutional credibility. That said, such decisions must be made with caution and evaluated on a case-by-case basis, ensuring that the accused’s right to a fair trial remains fully protected. The Court could also benefit from appointing dedicated communications personnel to prevent misinformation and bolster public confidence.

The Justice Varma case has renewed calls to revive the National Judicial Appointments Commission. Should the government have a say in judicial appointments?

Sanjay Hegde: The government already holds a seat at the table. The real question is whether it should wield a blank cheque. Even before the collegium finalises its recommendations, informal consultations with the executive are often undertaken. After the names are forwarded, the government retains the power to flag Intelligence Bureau inputs for the collegium’s reconsideration. There have also been several instances where the government has stalled appointments by simply sitting on the recommendations. This de facto executive veto has prevented many deserving judges from reaching the Supreme Court.

Alok Prasanna Kumar: We should no longer call it the collegium system; it now resembles a search-and-selection committee. While the High Court and Supreme Court collegium recommend names, the Union government follows a pick-and-choose approach. This has dissuaded many deserving candidates from subjecting themselves to an opaque and often humiliating process. Ultimately, it does not matter whether judges are appointed by the government, the judiciary, or a combination of the two. What matters is transparency. The D.Y. Chandrachud-led collegium made progress on this front by publishing resolutions that detailed the rationale behind each recommendation. Regrettably, the practice has been discontinued.

Should the Judicial Standards and Accountability Bill, 2010, be reconsidered?

Alok Prasanna Kumar: I don’t think so. It fails to address several critical gaps. What we need is a more calibrated and institutional response. The first step should be to define clear, enforceable judicial standards. Consider the issue of familial ties in the judiciary — every judge should be mandated to disclose relatives practising in the same court. Once disclosed, either the judge must be transferred or the relative barred from appearing before that court. Merely setting up more oversight bodies is not the solution. These institutions would inevitably be staffed by retired judges, thereby perpetuating the same structural flaws we seek to remedy.

Sanjay Hegde: More than legislative reform, we need to focus on the fact that the legal profession already operates through an informal system of peer review. Long before a judge becomes entangled in a corruption scandal, there are usually murmurs within the corridors of the court. A meaningful step forward would be to institutionalise this peer review process by systematically incorporating inputs from bar associations and fellow judges. This would strengthen internal accountability.

Should contempt of court laws be liberalised to permit greater public scrutiny of judicial conduct?

Alok Prasanna Kumar: We can liberalise contempt of court laws, but unless there are consequences for judges who invoke them arbitrarily, such reforms will have little impact. It is also important to assess the context in which contempt is initiated — does it stem from a judge’s anger or fear, or is it a measured institutional response to someone deliberately spreading falsehoods to undermine public trust in the judiciary? That said, there must be space for good-faith discourse on judicial corruption without the spectre of criminal contempt looming over those who voice legitimate concerns.

Published – April 11, 2025 01:39 am IST