The President of China, Xi Jinping’s three-nation tour of Southeast Asia (April 14-18, 2025) to Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia, had one goal: to pitch Beijing as the only reliable partner of choice. Facing what is at the moment a 145% tariff on Chinese exports imposed by the Trump administration, China is actively recalibrating its external economic engagement, especially in geographies where it enjoys strategic proximity and relatively receptive partners.
This Southeast Asia outreach is not just routine diplomacy. It is a considered move by Beijing to mitigate external economic pressure, project stability, and cement its leadership narrative in the Indo-Pacific. The visit also comes in the wake of the “Central Conference on Work Relating to Neighbouring Countries” (April 8-9). This relatively rare workshop was attended by senior party leaders and underscored the importance of fostering a “community with a shared future” with neighbouring states.
As a buffer and bridge
China is keen to insulate itself from the ramifications of a deepening trade war with the U.S., which now extends beyond tariffs to export controls, technology bans and financial decoupling. In this context, Southeast Asia serves as a buffer and a bridge. It offers China resilient trade channels, manufacturing alternatives, and diplomatic partners to collectively push back against the narrative of de-risking or containment led by Washington.
Under U.S. President Donald Trump, Cambodia could face a combined tariff of up to 59% (including a 10% universal tariff and an additional 49% once a 90-day pause ends), while Vietnam and Malaysia would be hit with tariffs of 46% and 24%, respectively. Conversely, Mr. Xi’s message was that China is open for business, supports multilateralism, and opposes unilateral coercion — a direct rebuttal to U.S. policies. In Vietnam, his meeting with key Vietnamese leaders resulted in the signing of 45 cooperation agreements. In Malaysia, discussions focused on enhancing economic cooperation and addressing regional security concerns. The two countries signed over 30 agreements, encompassing sectors such as the digital economy, artificial intelligence, agriculture and infrastructure development. The Cambodia visit (Mr. Xi’s first since 2016), underscored China’s role as Cambodia’s largest investor and trading partner, with bilateral trade exceeding $15 billion in 2024. All these agreements, particularly the Funan Techo Canal project in Cambodia, are an effort to show that China continues to offer public goods and economic opportunities, while the U.S. pivots toward protectionism.
To project a contrast
Beyond economics, the visit was also about ideological and normative competition as Beijing attempts to draw a contrast between its model of non-interference and economic engagement, and what it portrays as U.S. interventionism and ideological rigidity. This narrative particularly resonates in Cambodia, which has long been a close political ally of Beijing, and to a lesser extent in Malaysia, where the government has sought to mostly maintain a balanced foreign policy between major powers.
Mr. Xi’s call to advance a code of conduct in the South China Sea, support for infrastructure development through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and lay an emphasis on cultural linkages are part of this soft power strategy. It seeks to recast China not just as a neighbour but as a normative leader in regional order-building, offering an alternative vision to the U.S.-led liberal international order.
The timing of this visit is politically significant. U.S. engagement with Southeast Asia has been episodic and often perceived to be reactive, despite Washington’s measures to the contrary. The U.S.’s Indo-Pacific strategy is also often seen in parts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as security heavy and narrowly focused on countering China. Mr. Xi’s visit, in contrast, offers tangible deliverables: infrastructure projects, digital collaboration, trade facilitation, and security dialogues.
By visiting key ASEAN members, he also played into intra-ASEAN dynamics. For instance, the effort to deepen ties with Vietnam, traditionally wary of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, is an attempt to reassure Hanoi. In Malaysia, China’s emphasis on peaceful dispute resolution and BRI collaboration appeals to a government that is cautious about becoming a pawn in the U.S.-China rivalry. While Washington continues to emphasise security partnerships — through AUKUS (Australia, the United Kingdom, the U.S.), the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, the U.S.), and bilateral alliances — China is doubling down on economic diplomacy, where the U.S. is perceived to have underdelivered. Initiatives such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity have been criticised for lacking market access incentives, in contrast to China’s clear offers of investment and trade.
The larger picture
Moreover, Beijing’s ability to present itself as an indispensable economic partner may complicate U.S. efforts to build a coalition to isolate or deter China economically. If Southeast Asia increasingly leans further towards economic interdependence with China, Washington will find it harder to operationalise a robust economic counter-strategy. Mr. Xi’s Southeast Asia tour is a forward-looking strategy to entrench Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific at a time of systemic flux. In the contest between the U.S. and China for regional primacy, this kind of diplomacy is calculated strategic positioning, with long-term implications for regional alignment, economic integration, and rule-setting.
Finally, this tour is also about domestic political signalling. For Mr. Xi, the ability to show that China is not internationally isolated, despite mounting western pressure, is crucial. The optics of warm receptions, economic deals, and strategic dialogues serve to buttress his authority at home and offset negative headlines around the economic slowdown or diplomatic frictions with the West. At the same time, they signal to the region — and the Global South at large — that China continues to be there for them to lean on. How receptive Southeast will be to Mr. Xi’s outreach, despite Beijing’s own unilateral tendencies, remains to be seen.
Harsh V. Pant is Vice President, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow – Indo-Pacific at the Observer Research Foundation
Published – May 02, 2025 12:08 am IST