Generational rage: on the upheaval in Nepal

The upheaval that swept Nepal on Tuesday, with protesters torching Parliament, the Supreme Court, political residences, and media offices while releasing prisoners, cannot be dismissed as a natural reaction to the previous day’s crackdown that killed 19 young demonstrators. These actions, following Prime Minister K.P. Oli’s resignation, reveal a violent nihilism that threatens to undo Nepal’s hard-won democratic gains. The “Gen Z protests” were born out of frustration with Nepal’s chronic political dysfunction. Less than two decades after the triumphant “Jan Andolan II” of 2005 overthrew absolute monarchy and promised a “Naya Nepal”, the political establishment has delivered only instability and self-serving governance. Since the 1990s, Nepal has cycled through 13 heads of government across 30 tenures. The leaders of the mainstream Nepali Congress, CPN-UML, and CPN-Maoist Centre have prioritised unethical alliances over electoral mandates. Leaders such as K.P. Oli and Sher Bahadur Deuba showed little inclination in supporting Jan Andolan II and the Constituent Assembly process in the 2000s, while Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal has prioritised staying in power. The consequences are stark: the economy banks on remittances, leading to significant youth out-migration, soaring unemployment, and failure of diversification in a country that the UN calls “least developed”.

The disillusionment resulting from an entire generation growing up watching its country’s potential squandered has now birthed new political forces. They include the Rashtriya Swatantra Party and independents such as Kathmandu Mayor Balendra Shah, reflecting a genuine public hunger for alternatives. However, some positions assumed by these new voices raise concerns. Mr. Shah’s call to dissolve the elected Parliament, rather than for a caretaker government, leading to elections, suggests either democratic immaturity or, more dangerously, a willingness to abandon democratic norms. Bangladesh’s recent upheaval, which led to democratic backsliding, offers a cautionary tale. Nepal must not mistake the destruction of state and civil society institutions to be democratic renewal. The crisis demands stabilisation and long-term constitutional reform that fulfil the promises made before the Constituent Assembly process, but which were diluted by the time the Constitution was written. A presidential system with direct elections and accountable to an elected Parliament could break the cycle of instability. But constitutional reform means nothing without immediate peace. The Nepali Army must step forward to create space for civilian democratic actors to reassert control and chart reform. The alternative — allowing violent nihilism to masquerade as democratic renewal — risks destroying the very foundations upon which any “Naya Nepal” must be built.