Has the Pahalgam attack crossed a red line?

The Prime Minister has said that he has given the military “a free hand” for operations. Pakistan’s government has been saying every 24 hours that an attack is imminent. Given the indicators that a military option will be exercised next, would you say that all non-military options have been exhausted?

Sharat Sabharwal: There seems to be no diplomacy between the two countries at the moment. We know that some other countries, notably the U.S., have said that they are in touch with both sides and have urged them not to escalate matters. But what would it take for Pakistan to do something, which would be acceptable to our government, which would then move us towards de-escalation? There is nothing of that kind on the horizon. The government has to take into account the strong public sentiment on the issue, the record of what was done in 2016 (in Uri) and in 2019 (in Pulwama), (India’s) surgical strikes and Balakot strike in response and the expectation now that there will be some finite action.

Lt Gen (Retd) Deependra Singh Hooda: I think some non-military options are still on the table, such as international pressure, especially on Pakistan, to back off. But the statements coming from Pakistan, such as ‘Indian blood will flow through the Indus’, are very hostile. I don’t see any give from the Pakistani side. Therefore, if there are no options left, then some sort of use of military force seems the only way forward.

I wouldn’t read too much into the ‘free hand’ that has been given to the forces. Obviously, the military has always had a free hand in preparing for any action. In 2016, when we were planning the cross-border operation, the government didn’t interfere at all in the planning. But the military cannot move when it wants. Whatever is contemplated must get political approval.

Would a Pakistani offer to assist with the investigation, as was the case in 2008 after the Mumbai attacks and then in 2016 after the Pathankot airbase attack, be de-escalatory?

Sharat Sabharwal: There has been no such offer [from Pakistan] this time. There is complete denial and there are belligerent statements being made. Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir is a hard-liner, going by his speeches and public pronouncements. After Pathankot, it was Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif who made the offer, but he was helpless in front of the Army chief, and [the investigation] went nowhere. In 2008, a lot of international pressure was built up on Pakistan, especially because nationals of other countries also got killed in the attacks (in Mumbai).

How would rate the government’s five-point diplomatic measures so far?

Lt Gen (Retd) Deependra Singh Hooda: Many of those measures will have a limited impact, given how we didn’t trade at the borders or give many visas anyway. I think what is significant in the long term is holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance, and linking its resumption with terrorist activities in Pakistan.

Sharat Sabharwal: Clearly what has agitated Pakistan is the move on the Indus Waters Treaty. The remaining measures are largely symbolic. The integrated check post opened in 2012, but has never been used to its potential. The number of visas had gone down significantly over the years in any case. On the Indus Waters Treaty, Pakistan had apprehensions all along that at some stage India would decide to divert Pakistan’s share of water. This hurts [Pakistan]. In the short term, we can stop giving hydrological data which is used for managing flows and floods. We can build our own projects without adhering to the stipulations of the Treaty in informing Pakistan. We are technically challenged by the lack of infrastructure and the heights at which those rivers flow. But the psychological pressure on Pakistan is something new.

Are there lessons learned from responses in the past — 2008, 2016, 2019, etc. — when we think about the response that is to come?

Sharat Sabharwal: In 2008, there was no publicised punitive activity, but international pressure built up and resulted in Pakistan not only acknowledging that Ajmal Kasab was their national, but also ordering an investigation by their federal investigation agency. It was at this stage that I went as High Commissioner in April 2009. In June, [Pakistan] gave us a 30-page dossier, in which they acknowledged for the first and the last time that the attack was mounted from their territory and launched by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). And they gave us elaborate details of the training, of where the boat was launched, etc. They took seven people into custody and launched a prosecution in an anti-terrorism court, all of which offered us a way towards de-escalation. We resumed dialogue in March 2011. In 2012, we saw the lowest level of violence along the Line of Control (LoC) and in Jammu and Kashmir since the turn of the century. This is not something that necessarily offers us any options for today, as it is not clear whether Pakistan would be willing to admit what it did, or whether that will [alone] be acceptable to the [Modi] government.

Lt Gen (Retd) Deependra Singh Hooda: In 2016, we had planned for a reaction, but Pakistan said “nothing happened” and did not retaliate (to the surgical strikes). The Pakistani response to the Balakot strikes in 2019 taught us that there would be retaliation after that. After 2019, Pakistani strategists have written about a strategy of ‘quid pro quo plus’ — that is, reacting in an equal manner plus a little more — if India does something. So, as we contemplate actions now, we need to prepare for that. In 2019, we hadn’t looked at this aspect enough, so there was a hasty reaction to Pakistan’s retaliation. We need to see what is the lowest level of military force which can be considered a success from our side. People have suddenly started talking about ‘taking PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir)’; that is far-fetched.

If taking PoK is far-fetched, how about a surgical strike on the LeT leadership, such as Hafiz Saeed?

Lt Gen (Retd) Deependra Singh Hooda: That is a possibility if we have the kind of intelligence and capability the U.S. had [in taking out Osama Bin Laden]. It is possible. And that is a legitimate target for us.

Sharat Sabharwal: We also need to draw some lessons on what impact these actions have on the minds of Pakistan’s terror planners. They lull the terror activity to some extent, but this attack makes it clear that we do not have the capacity to secure an enduring change in Pakistan’s behaviour yet.

Can we speak about diplomatic engagement then? Even after 2019, we had the 2021 LoC ceasefire negotiations. In 2024, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar travelled to Islamabad for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), although he didn’t hold a bilateral dialogue. Should such measures end as well?

Sharat Sabharwal: The primary challenge we have now is China. Our responsibilities on that side of the border (Line of Actual Control) have grown. I believe it is in our interest to keep the western border as calm as possible. At the moment it is very volatile because of what has happened. We cannot leave the SCO just because Pakistan is part of it or because China has an active role in it. We must think of larger considerations.

Lt Gen (Retd) Deependra Singh Hooda: A ceasefire in 2021 made strategic sense. We were looking more closely at the military challenge from China, at the fact that a large number of forces had got deployed there (at the LAC). We cannot completely insulate the ceasefire from the state of India-Pakistan relations as they exist today. We are already seeing breaches on the ceasefire line and I think that will only increase. Obviously both sides have built up additional forces along the LoC, expecting something to happen. There will be suspicion regarding any movement taking place on both sides. If and when military action takes place, I think the ceasefire will not survive.

Has the Pahalgam attack drawn a line? Is there any chance of bilateral, diplomatic engagement in the future?

Lt Gen (Retd) Deependra Singh Hooda: For now, the attack has drawn a red line. We can’t look five or 10 years down the line, but in the immediate future, I don’t see any positive engagement happening. We see only rhetoric from Pakistan — on war, nuclear weapons, etc.

Sharat Sabharwal: My reading is that the trajectory of this relationship, even beyond the resolution of this crisis, remains sombre. Diplomacy has taken a complete backseat for various reasons. First, our ‘terror and talks cannot go together’ policy. Second, Pakistan’s unreasonable demand, which it sticks to, that India must withdraw the Article 370 move, for any bilateral engagement. The two countries are dependent entirely on security, deterrence, and coercion to manage the relationship. Ideally, coercion should be a means to an end, with its impact being leveraged at some stage through dialogue and diplomacy to bring the adversary to a more desirable stage. I don’t think permanent peace between India and Pakistan is on the cards, given the nature of the Pakistani state. Our aim should be to manage this relationship at the lowest possible level of pain. Because if it is a journey of coercion, and coercion becomes an end in itself, that creates an environment that is prone to volatility. Our security forces protect us brilliantly against most of that volatility, but there is always a chance of the enemy getting through.

In the aftermath of the Pahalgam attack, there is a spotlight on Pakistani Army chief Gen Asim Munir. Is he different from past Pakistan Army chiefs?

Lt Gen (Retd) Deependra Singh Hooda: Absolutely, if you look at the speech that he gave in which he talked about Kashmir being the jugular vein and how Hindus and Muslims are completely different. The character of this attack is also different, and is much more deliberate: singling out tourists, singling out unarmed civilians, trying to identify religious identities, and shooting males only in front of their wives and children. This was, I think, a very deliberate provocation, with possibly some [Pakistan Army] training. It’s not possible that some local terrorist group has thought this up.

Sharat Sabharwal: Yes, I have seen a difference right from the beginning. If you look at previous chiefs, such as General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, General Pervez Musharraf, General Qamar Javed Bajwa… each of them had some idea of taking Pakistan forward. There is no such idea that has come from [General Munir].. Some of his public statements repeat what has been said by the Pakistanis earlier, but the way he speaks, it seems he is a hard-liner. And you see the kind of approach that is being taken in this crisis.

Should India’s response also factor in a Chinese role, given Chinese Finance Minister Wang Yi’s statement in support of “Pakistan’s sovereignty”?

Sharat Sabharwal: Well, China has not only supported Pakistan’s right to defend its sovereignty and legitimate security interests, but they have also favoured an “impartial probe”, which Pakistan suggested as a diversionary tactic. We must understand that China is now more deeply invested in Pakistan than ever before because of the CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor), which is its route to the sea, bypassing the maritime choke points in the east, notably the Malacca Straits. 80% of Pakistan’s weaponry comes from China. There are very close linkages across the board between the armed forces, and economically. Whether China gets involved now, however, depends upon what kind of action we take and on Pakistan’s response and what it develops into.

Lt Gen (Retd) Deependra Singh Hooda: As long as Chinese interests in the CPEC are not threatened, I don’t see China trying to do something apart from perhaps intelligence sharing. After five years, India and China are normalising the LAC in some sense. Would they put that in danger, especially when they want to come together economically to deal with the U.S.’s tariffs? I don’t think they will jeopardise all that unless there is a massive escalation.

Given all this, what kind of military response would you suggest?

Sharat Sabharwal: It is up to the government [to decide]. Both the government and the armed forces should be free to choose the place and time of action, but it is preferable to do it without publicity if possible, as that would reduce chances of escalation. When you publicise actions, you force the other side to further action, given the imperatives of public sentiment.

Lt Gen (Retd) Deependra Singh Hooda: It is up to the government. I agree that the more we hype our actions, the more pressure there will be on Pakistan to retaliate.