The “new normal” in India’s fight against terrorism, which Prime Minister Narendra Modi is seeking to establish after the horrific terror attack at Pahalgam on April 22, 2025, is neither based on complete information nor a rigorous security review of Operation Sindoor. Unlike Pakistan, India is a constitutional democracy, where major policies related to national security which impact the lives of millions of citizens need to be debated and discussed in Parliament. The political consensus vis-à-vis combating terrorism within India cannot be misused to truncate democratic processes or muzzle discussions on the fitness and the efficacy of anti-terror policies.
Retaliation as deterrent?
In his recent address to the nation, Mr. Modi stated that the surgical strikes following the terror attacks at Uri (September 2016), the air strikes after the February 2019 attack at Pulwama, and the recent offensive under Operation Sindoor “define” India’s policy against terrorism. Had the Indian strikes across the Line of Control (LoC) in 2016 and 2019 been effective as deterrents, the Pahalgam attack should not have occurred in the first place.
Can the retaliatory cross border strikes and calibrated military escalation attempted under Operation Sindoor serve as an effective deterrent? It remains doubtful due to several reasons.
First, investigations by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) have not yet been able to capture the perpetrators of the Pahalgam terror attack. This is crucial not only in order to secure justice for the innocent victims, but also to prevent them from attempting another attack. Second, Mr. Modi has claimed that over a 100 deadly terrorists were eliminated in India’s strikes on their hideouts and training facilities, which includes Bahawalpur and Muridke, located deep inside Pakistan’s territory. Yet, the government to date has not been able to confirm the identities of the neutralised terrorists beyond five high value terrorists.
In contrast, nine out of the 10 terrorists involved in the Mumbai terror attacks of November 2008 were gunned down by the Mumbai police and National Security Guard (NSG) commandos. Ajmal Kasab was arrested, interrogated, tried and sentenced to death by India’s judicial system. True, the Mumbai attack was a fidayeen suicide mission. But, importantly, the investigations uncovered the terror plot hatched by the Lashkar-e-Taiba, thoroughly exposed the role played by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and eventually caught up with international terrorists such as David Headley and Tahawwur Rana; Rana was finally extradited to India from the United States in April. India was also successful in diplomatically isolating Pakistan after 26/11.
Ironically, the Prime Minister’s references to “nuclear blackmail” in his recent address and his warning call to Pakistan to dismantle its “terror infrastructure” for its own survival, expose the limits of this doctrine.
The security calculus
That the military establishment of Pakistan is hand in glove with terrorist organisations operating on both its eastern and western borders has been established and documented over the decades. It was vividly exposed by Indian investigations after the Mumbai terror attacks. The takeout of Osama bin Laden by the U.S. military in May 2011 from Pakistan’s Abbottabad was another clear pointer.
The fact remains that the military superpowers such as the U.S., China and Russia — now joined by wannabe power Türkiye — continue to supply military hardware, advanced technologies, finance and offer diplomatic assistance to the Pakistan military, being perfectly aware of their sinister end-uses. Unless this reservoir of material, strategic and diplomatic support for Pakistan’s military-terrorism complex, dries up, effective deterrence cannot be achieved.
A realistic cost-benefit analysis of Operation Sindoor should objectively assess the damage inflicted on the Indian side not only in terms of military lives and hardware but also in terms of civilian lives lost in Pakistani shelling across the LoC in Jammu and Kashmir. Obfuscation of such human casualties and operational losses does little to enhance India’s credibility in the global arena.
Notwithstanding the Prime Minister’s rhetoric on “Made in India” weapons being tested and proven in Operation Sindoor — establishing India’s superiority in “new age warfare” — the crucial weapons systems used by India during the conflict are its expensive procurements from French, Russian and Israeli suppliers. Pakistan’s arms inventory includes procurements from China, Russia, the U.S. and Türkiye. These foreign suppliers of high-tech arms are the only winners in such “new age warfare”, with no clear victor or the vanquished among the parties in actual conflict.
The alacrity with which the U.S. intervened to terminate Operation Sindoor and sought to impose a ceasefire serves as a reality check for India’s security and foreign policy establishment. The near-simultaneous nuclear weaponisation of both India and Pakistan from the late 1990s has created a durable ground for international intervention in any conflict between the nuclear-armed neighbours, weakening the edifice of the Simla Agreement, signed after India’s decisive victory in the 1971 Bangladesh war.
Earlier, it was only Pakistan which wanted to internationalise its territorial conflict with India over Kashmir, while India consistently resisted any departure from the bipartite framework. With India’s increasing acceptance of U.S. mediation over time — evident from the recent ceasefire with Pakistan — another nail has been driven into the coffin of the Simla Agreement.
Strategic reset required
There is a plausible case for India to explore pathways of engaging with Pakistan in the context of changes in the geopolitical landscape and global power dynamics in the past five decades. Terrorism motivated by religious bigotry, with or without state sponsorship, has, indeed, emerged as a complex strategic threat for nation-states across the world.
However, the new anti-terror doctrine articulated by Mr. Modi falls short on retrospective insight, being premised on the same tried-and-failed formula of the war on terror by the U.S. and Israel. With its nuclear trigger as existing leverage, the Pakistan military shall now have an additional trigger to start a new cycle of terror and conflict with India.
Rather, priority must be accorded to the NIA investigation and bringing the perpetrators of the Pahalgam terror attack to justice. This is vital for the credibility of India’s anti-terror stance. Diplomatic efforts should be renewed to persuade the U.S., China and Russia to stop arming and financing the military-terrorist complex in Pakistan.
India needs to work together with all international stakeholders to restore civilian rule and democracy in Pakistan, which alone can defuse religious extremism and dismantle its terrorist infrastructure.
This is not an easily attainable objective, but is certainly a more practicable and realistic one, compared to dystopian military non-solutions. An informed parliamentary debate on Operation Sindoor and the Prime Minister’s new anti-terror doctrine is essential before it actually becomes the “new normal”.
Prasenjit Bose is an economist and activist
Published – May 19, 2025 12:16 am IST