On April 24, India announced that it would hold the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) of 1960 in abeyance until Pakistan ceased its support for cross-border terrorism. The term “abeyance,” as used by the Government of India, suggests a temporary suspension, leaving open the possibility of reinstatement should Pakistan take credible steps to curb terrorism, particularly in light of the Pahalgam terror attack, on April 22.
The meaning of ‘abeyance’
The term “abeyance” finds no legal recognition under the IWT or the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (VCLT). India is not a party to the VCLT, while Pakistan has signed it, but has not ratified it. Further, unilateral suspension of treaty obligations, as implied by “abeyance,” lacks legitimacy under customary international law and international water law that promotes ‘water cooperation’ as the peremptory norm fundamental to the international legal order. Critically, in the IWT’s, Articles XII(3) and (4) stipulate that modifications or termination require a mutually ratified treaty — a prospect that seems remote given the current status quo between India-Pakistan.
Thus, the IWT’s specific provisions preclude unilateral suspension of substantive or procedural obligations. More broadly, in the VCLT, Articles 60, 61, and 62 permit suspension of a treaty only under exceptional circumstances, such as a material breach, impossibility of performance, or a fundamental change in circumstances, respectively — none of which India has formally invoked. Therefore, India’s invocation of “abeyance” may be seen as a political signal rather than a legally enforceable action, potentially putting procedural cooperation on hold. In practical terms, by using abeyance, India can temporarily refuse to carry out all joint mechanisms necessary for the treaty’s operation. India can choose not to share details on water resource development projects on western rivers and hydrological data crucial for flood forecasting and planning for irrigation, hydropower and drinking water that could jeopardise Pakistan’s water interests, internal water planning and water security, temporarily if not permanently. Moreover, India could flush silt from its reservoirs (which also requires reservoirs to be filled) without issuing any prior warning to Pakistan.
On January 25, 2023, New Delhi issued a notice to Pakistan through the Indus Commissioners, citing a material breach of the IWT. India argued that Pakistan’s unilateral decision to approach the Permanent Court of Arbitration violated the treaty’s dispute resolution mechanisms outlined in Articles VIII and IX. This time, New Delhi has invoked the Treaty as a counter-terrorism deterrent, opting for the term “abeyance” rather than “suspension” or “termination”.
This choice raises pertinent questions. Article 60 of the VCLT allows for the termination or suspension of a treaty in response to a material breach. Does Pakistan’s alleged support for cross-border terrorism not constitute such a breach? Likewise, Article 62 permits treaty suspension or withdrawal in the event of a fundamental change in circumstances. Could the persistent threat to national security from cross-border terrorism not fulfil this condition? Yet, these arguments hinge on untested legal interpretations, as neither the IWT nor customary international law explicitly links terrorism to treaty obligations, risking escalation in an already volatile bilateral relationship.
Abeyance as a two-level game
The decision to use “abeyance” likely arises from strategic and tactical considerations. First, India’s Cabinet Committee on Security may have opted for abeyance as a cautious step to address public sentiment quickly and offer solace to grieving families. The limited time to fully evaluate the legal and diplomatic implications may have influenced this decision. Second, abeyance may also reflect a calculated move to relieve itself from the continuous legal objection it had witnessed vis-à-vis the construction of run-of-the-river projects planned on western rivers. India could leverage this pause to consolidate its rights to optimally use its entitled water usage allocations in western and eastern rivers, particularly through infrastructure projects that enhance its control over the Indus waters. However, this strategy risks escalating tensions, as Pakistan, heavily dependent on the Indus waters, is already viewing such actions as an ‘act of war’ and a direct threat to its water security.
The choice of terminology is even more critical given Pakistan’s current instability. With the military losing the support of the youth since Imran Khan’s imprisonment and its attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue during the U.S. Vice-President’s India visit, Pakistan’s political and economic instability is even more visible. This uncertainty makes it challenging for New Delhi to navigate relations with a state in turmoil. Did India fully account for this while formulating the decision announced by the Foreign Secretary? In such a context, can the abeyance of the IWT genuinely exert meaningful pressure on Pakistan? More fundamentally, will leveraging the IWT as a tool to compel Pakistan to end its support for cross-border terrorism prove effective at all?
It is widely acknowledged that Pakistan, as a failing state, is unlikely to comply with India’s demands. By invoking “abeyance”, India may buy time to pursue domestic goals, particularly advancing water infrastructure projects on the western and eastern rivers. Many of these projects, including the Kishenganga, Baglihar, and Ratle hydel projects, have faced significant delays due to Pakistan’s legal interventions. This move could provide India with the leverage needed to expedite such initiatives. While the Kishenganga and Baglihar were eventually resolved, projects such as Tulbul-Navigation and Ratle remain uncertain. These long-standing tensions, along with the 2021 Parliamentary Committee’s emphasis on the need for infrastructure to fully utilise India’s allocated waters, mark a critical inflexion point. However, questions persist about the feasibility of such projects, especially regarding environmental clearances.
In the weeks and months ahead, we could witness a complex interplay of domestic and international strategies, or a “two-level game”, between India and Pakistan. Both nations must manage domestic expectations, engage diplomatically to safeguard their interests, and justify their actions as victories. For India, invoking the IWT in “abeyance” serves dual purposes: domestically, it demonstrates a firm stance against terrorism, aligning with public sentiment and reinforcing national security priorities. Internationally, it signals India’s frustration with Pakistan’s alleged support for terrorism. But could there be more to this strategy?
Ramifications for India
While in India, the decision has resonated emotionally with the public and garnered widespread political support, it risks overshadowing the more profound implications of such a strategy. On the global stage, unilaterally violating the IWT could lead to India facing the Permanent Court of Arbitration or the International Court of Justice, damaging its credibility as a responsible international actor. However, domestically, the strategy raises critical questions about the balance between national security and ecological prudence. The rush to fast-track water infrastructure projects, ostensibly to strengthen India’s water rights, risks bypassing essential public and environmental scrutiny. Such actions could have dire consequences in the biodiversity-rich and seismically sensitive Indus basin. Weaponising water resources as a strategic tool may provide short-term leverage but could inadvertently harm India, undermining the foundational principles of democratic governance and constitutional integrity.
At the same time, public sentiment demands a stronger stance against Pakistan, with some public intellectuals advocating escalated military actions akin to the surgical strikes of 2016 and 2019. While such actions might serve as immediate displays of strength, they do not address the root cause of cross-border terrorism. The challenge lies in navigating a path that satisfies national sentiment while ensuring long-term stability and security. New Delhi must carefully craft its narrative and future on-the-ground steps around the IWT abeyance, ensuring that India aligns with broader geopolitical goals and has a sound legal basis within the IWT framework.
Actions taken must reflect strategic foresight, aiming to pressure Pakistan into reevaluating its stance on cross-border terrorism while avoiding harm to India’s own ecological and social fabric. The focus should remain on measures that strengthen India’s position as a responsible global power, leveraging its democratic values and environmental stewardship. This would uphold India’s international standing, ensuring that its actions do not inadvertently harm the region that it seeks to protect.
Anamika Barua is Professor, Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati; Sumit Vij is Assistant Professor, Wageningen University and Research, The Netherlands; Medha Bisht is Associate Professor, South Asian University, India; M. Shawahiq Siddiqui is an environmental lawyer in India; Neeraj Singh Manhas is Adviser for South Asia, Parley Policy Initiative, Republic of Korea
Published – May 06, 2025 12:16 am IST