“I was told to kill as many Hindus as possible. We were told that Muslims in J&K are not allowed to pray,” confessed lanky Mohammad Abdullah, his jawline shadowed by the sparse, hesitant beard of his teenage years. Abdullah was involved in the killing of 28 slum dwellers, including many children, in Qasim Nagar on the evening of July 13, 2002, on the outskirts of Jammu city. In a powerful act of resistance, Kaka, a Gujjar Muslim and resident of the nearby Raikha forests, risked his life to subdue the armed militant on August 2 with a cot, and tied him with a rope when the militant sought shelter in his home, as the police searched the nearby forests for the hiding terrorists. Kaka alerted the police and ensured the perpetrator was handed over to the authorities.
The words of Mohammad Abdullah were no different from those of Ajmal Kasab, one of the terrorists who was nabbed by a daredevil act of Mumbai police assistant sub-inspector Tukaram Omble during the Mumbai terror attack of 2008. Armed only with a lathi (bamboo stick), Omble charged at the hijacked vehicle and was shot five times after he opened the passenger door where Kasab was seated. In Mumbai, the dead also included 26 foreign nationals from 14 different countries.
These are among the few cases in which terrorists who carried out carnage were arrested and can be cited as clinching evidence of Pakistani nationals’ involvement in some of the attacks that gained international attention.
Finding support: On Operation Sindoor, international reaction
The recent strikes under Operation Sindoor, carried out by India in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, some of which are well-known in the public domain, mark a new chapter in India’s fight against terrorism. Apart from demonstrating capabilities to strike, it is also an illustration of the intent. At the same time, we can safely conclude that the danger of terrorism is far from over.
Having studied the subject of terrorism consistently from within the society, not from conference tables, but from the ground up, including at the UNHQ in New York, I remain struck by the recurring patterns: the repetition in discourse, the familiar reactions and the predictable strategies, both domestically and internationally. In the hinterland, the question dominating everyone’s mind is why an incident with eyewitnesses has failed to galvanise the international community in India’s favour. There is a deep sense of revulsion over the fact that most major powers have merely called for restraint and urged both India and Pakistan to cooperate in identifying the perpetrators. India’s diplomatic efforts to confront terrorism at the U.N. have yielded partial victories but systemic inertia. While some explanations are self-evident, there are also deeper, multidimensional reasons worth examining to understand why India’s narrative fails to resonate in the international — or rather Western — capitals, despite consistent reinforcement of the same theme in national discourse. Western understanding holds significant weight because it shapes multilateral frameworks and trade preferences that are vital lifelines for Pakistan’s economy.
Patterns of infiltration
First, from strictly the security lens, there is little ambiguity that infiltration from across the border continues unabated, actively enabled by Pakistan’s military establishment. The infrastructure of terror, training camps, launch pads, and logistical networks, operates with the tacit, and often explicit, support of official agencies across the border. Anyone who has tracked the international border and Line of Control since 1990 is aware of the distinct patterns of infiltration. The tunnels along the International border (IB) that enable the entry of the terrorists from Sialkot district to J&K cannot be dug without the support of the official agencies from across the border. In this connection, the current attack is especially alarming because warning signs were there on the ground. In the weeks preceding it, ground intelligence pointed to a spike in infiltration attempts, particularly through the Samba-Kathua sector in the south, and the Rajouri-Poonch-Baramulla axis along the IB and Line of Control. These areas, due to their topography and socio-cultural overlap with Pakistani Punjab and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir, provide both cover and convenient access for infiltrators. Locals had repeatedly raised concerns with both ruling and opposition parties, but their warnings were ignored.
It’s akin to someone hurling combustible material at a house day after day, and we notice only when the blaze erupts. The danger was always present, accumulating in plain sight, but the response, both domestic and international, is triggered only when the fire breaks out. We recognise the fire, but continue to ignore the arsonist’s intent. Our knowledge ecosystem around terrorism remains narrow and incident-driven. Beyond investing in creating modern technology to detect and capture infiltration, proactive diplomatic action highlights these facts as they are unfolding. When signs of infiltration emerge, we must immediately alert the world capitals to the risks and consequences. Prior to the Baisaran attack, a series of civilian killings in the hilly terrain of Kathua signalled a consistent inflow of terrorists. The killings took place in areas that serve as a route for terrorists making their way to the Doda-Kishtwar hills that border Anantnag district in which Baisaran falls. While there are other granular factors contributing to the increased infiltration in recent years, those issues lie outside the scope of this piece. In a nutshell, by providing the topographical context, the relevant interlocutors from the international community should be timely made aware of the challenges facing India’s counter-infiltration grid.
The Baisaran attack shows clear signs of involvement by non-Kashmiri-speaking terrorists unfamiliar with the social fabric of Jammu and Kashmir. Evidence suggests that the assailants who interacted with the victims and their families were not locals. For example, a local Kashmiri-speaking pony operator, wearing a Kashmiri pheran, interviewed on television, recounted that the attackers asked him about his religious identity. A native Kashmiri or even a non-Kashmiri from the region is well-versed in linguistic, cultural, and visual cues, and he would not need to ask such a question, as they will clearly know the ethnic or religious details of Pony operators in the area, who are either Kashmiri Muslims or Gujjar Muslims. This distinction is critical in identifying the attackers’ origins. These granular distinctions should have been underscored early on, as the trajectory of evidence collection and initial official claims must account for these societal nuances. This is particularly important when presenting the case to key members of the international community, where credibility hinges on detailed, culturally-informed assessments.
Perception of contested conflict zone
Second, Indian response is often reactive and ad hoc, such as after the Parliament attack on 13 December 2001, leaving the international community with little context or time to fully grasp the complexity of the situation, especially the scale of cross-border involvement. Since most attacks take place in J&K or have a linkage with Jammu and Kashmir, the region is widely perceived as a contested conflict zone, where both sides are seen to hold equally opposing narratives.
There is a lesson here. In March 1994, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), along with the Islamic Republic of Iran, bailed India out when Pakistan moved a resolution at the UN Human Rights Council at Geneva for sending a fact-finding mission to Jammu and Kashmir. With a much weaker political and economic heft, India fielded its top political leaders, from the opposition and ruling party, and diplomatic talent, including Atal Behari Vajpayee, Manmohan Singh, Farooq Abdullah, and India’s Permanent Representative to the UNHQ, Hamid Ansari. The delegation also included a public intellectual, Balraj Puri, whose insights helped articulate the historical and contemporary dimensions of the Kashmir issue. This all-of-society approach proved effective in challenging the binary narrative, urging the international community to adopt a more nuanced perspective on Jammu and Kashmir.
Communicating the human cost of terrorism
Third, some actors in the international community view the terrorism threat through a specific lens, which often influences how they perceive the challenges faced by India. A more proactive approach to counterterrorism, therefore, requires greater transparency and accountability, with policies and actions consistently anchored in the rule of law and avoiding human rights violations. Strengthening institutions like the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), both in capacity and mandate, can ensure that justice is not only provided but seen to be done, reinforcing the credibility of India’s counterterrorism efforts. A conspicuous gap also exists in the factual and objective sustained storytelling about the victims, networks, and threats India faces. This lack of narrative weakens the emotional and political salience of India’s case on the global stage. While global narratives of terrorism victims are increasingly amplified to garner public and diplomatic support, India must also invest in consistently communicating the human cost of terrorism and the complexities of the threats it confronts. By doing so, it would not only build empathy but also reinforce the legitimacy of India’s counterterrorism efforts within the international community.
One poignant example is the story of the family of the late Haji Mohammad Qasim, whom I first met in a hospital as he tended to his relatives wounded in an attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists in 2004. He and members of his clan had taken up arms to drive terrorists out of the Pir Panjal hamlets; among the first organised local efforts of resistance. That encounter marked the beginning of many journeys with him through the remote villages of the Pir Panjal range, where I witnessed firsthand their resolve and suffering. Twenty-eight-year-old Syed Adil Hussain Shah’s story in the recent Baisaran attack is another searing example of this ongoing tragedy.
These stories are just a few among countless others in Jammu and Kashmir, where victims span all ethnic and religious backgrounds. Amplifying their voices on the global stage is essential, not only to humanise the conflict, but to foster a deeper, more nuanced international understanding of the complexities of India’s counterterrorism struggle.
Selective priorities
Four, coming to the multilateral arena, there is a structural reality playing out that doesn’t entirely go in India’s favour. While India pushes for initiatives like the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT), it hasn’t managed to build strong, sustained global coalitions. Apart from this, India’s legitimate concerns about terrorism are often minimised on the world stage due to a combination of geopolitical rivalries, perception management failures and the global community’s selective priorities. For instance, the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States fundamentally reshaped the architecture and discourse of counter-terrorism (CT) at the United Nations. The Security Council’s Resolution 1373, adopted just 17 days after the attacks, provided the foundational framework for international CT cooperation by obligating all member states to criminalize terrorism financing, deny safe haven to terrorists, and improve information sharing. Over the past two decades, the Council has passed numerous follow-up resolutions, and a vast CT infrastructure has emerged within the UN system. Yet, despite the procedural expansion and normative growth, the world has consistently failed to acknowledge and respond adequately to India’s counter-terrorism concerns. This dissonance between international CT architecture and India’s lived experience of terrorism stems from a confluence of factors: definitional deadlock, geopolitical hypocrisy, selective enforcement, and the instrumentalisation of CT norms by major powers.
At the heart of the global CT failure lies an unresolved and politically fraught question: what constitutes terrorism? India has, since 1996, championed a Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT) at the UN — an effort to codify a universal legal definition of terrorism. But more than two decades later, the effort remains stalled. Diplomatic foot-dragging is only part of the problem. Beneath the surface lie deep conceptual divisions among member states. The Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), representing 57 Muslim-majority nations, maintains that armed resistance to foreign occupation must be distinguished from terrorism. This position, couched in international humanitarian law, is seen by countries like the U.S. and India as offering a loophole for groups that target civilians under the pretext of resistance. As an eyewitness to this process at the sixth committee of the General Assembly, the definitional gridlock means that while member states pay rhetorical homage to fighting terrorism, they remain divided on whom and what they are fighting. This ambiguity weakens legal enforcement, undermines political coherence, and more importantly, creates diplomatic space for selective outrage.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the UN Security Council also created powerful mechanisms such as the 1267 Sanctions Committee, which initially targeted Taliban and later expanded to include al-Qaida and ISIL affiliates. These mechanisms now operate under the authority of UNSC Resolution 2253 (2015) and are supported by an Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team that tracks CT trends globally. In theory, these institutions should provide a robust, rules-based mechanism to identify and sanction terrorist actors. In practice, however, they have been routinely undermined by geopolitics, especially by the strategic calculations of the P-5 (permanent members of the Security Council). For instance, India’s experience illustrates this vividly. It took a decade for the UN to list Masood Azhar, the leader of Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), a group responsible for attacks on the Indian Parliament (2001), Pathankot airbase (2016), and the deadly Pulwama bombing (2019). Despite ample evidence, including public video confessions and intelligence-backed dossiers, Azhar’s listing was repeatedly blocked by China on procedural grounds, only to be reversed in May 2019 after considerable international pressure and political calculus changed. The delay is not just a bureaucratic anomaly; it is emblematic of how India’s CT concerns are often dismissed, diluted, or delayed when they intersect with the geopolitical interests of powerful states. Also, the Security Council’s sanctions regimes, 14 of which are currently active, effect a hierarchy of political attention, with some regimes being rigorously enforced (e.g., Iran’s nuclear sanctions) and others languishing in procedural inertia. India, lacking veto power and a seat at the high table of the UNSC, often finds itself navigating a system that rewards geopolitical leverage rather than principled consistency.
On the contrary, the rapid listing of Hafiz Saeed, the alleged mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attacks, stands in stark contrast, triggered by global outrage and Western fatalities. Moreover, calls for greater due process, while normatively sound, are sometimes weaponised to delay or dilute sanctions efforts. For example, the creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson was a step toward procedural fairness, but it also added bureaucratic layers that can be exploited to stall listings. Another obstacle lies in the evidentiary demands of listing individuals under UN sanctions. Most petitions rely on classified intelligence. But presenting “irrefutable evidence” that does not compromise operational capacity is difficult. This technical challenge, however, becomes a convenient excuse for political vetoes, especially when the evidence comes from a country whose strategic interests may not align with those of the P-5.
In this connection, it may be mentioned that following the devastating Baisaran attack on April 22, 2025, which resulted in the deaths of 26 civilians, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) issued a press statement on April 25 condemning the attack as a “reprehensible act of terrorism.” However, the language was notably more neutral compared to past statements, such as after the 2019 Pulwama attack. Notably, The Resistance Front (TRF), an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba, initially claimed responsibility for the attack but later retracted its claim. TRF has been designated as a terrorist organisation by India and is known for targeting civilians and security forces in Jammu and Kashmir. While TRF is a designated terrorist group by India and widely reported to be an offshoot of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), it has not been formally designated as a terrorist organisation by the UN Security Council’s 1267 Sanctions Committee. The UNSC typically avoids naming groups in official statements unless they are universally sanctioned or unambiguously linked to a designated terrorist organisation. The UNSC’s failure to mention TRF reflects both its procedural constraints and the realpolitik of power dynamics among its members, as Pakistan, which is right now an elected member of the council, claimed that it ensured that TRF is not mentioned in the statement. It may be mentioned here that the Council President Jérôme Bonnafont (France) had issued a statement after a meeting. The statement conveys condemnations, condolences or appeals, but does not require full Council consensus. In terms of political messaging, the Presidential statement (PRST) of the Security Council, reflecting the collective view of the Council, is more potent as it is issued after all fifteen (15) members agree on the text and it is only next to a UNSC resolution. These nuances become important in understanding how a given terrorist attack and landscape gets internalized by the important capitals of the international community.
Ground reality
Fifth, turning to the domestic arena, while governments are justified in claiming credit for successes against terrorism, there must be humility when facts on the ground suggest otherwise. Official data from the J&K intelligence apparatus, presented before the Upper house of the Parliament (Rajya Sabha) on 7th February, 2025, reveals no drastic decline in the threat of terrorism between 2019 and 2025. In 2019, there were 163 terrorist-initiated attacks; 126 in 2020; 129 in 2021; and 125 in 2022. The figure dropped to 46 in 2023, but in the absence of 2024 data, the trend line appears to mirror earlier patterns. Overreliance on figures, particularly when benchmarked against the early 2000s, a completely different geopolitical landscape, can breed a false sense of complacency. The decline or increase in attacks is not, by itself, an adequate reflection of the ground reality as the structural reasons for any potential spike exist.
The problem also lies in the post-2019 political discourse on J&K, which sought to tightly link the abrogation of Article 370 with the elimination of terrorism and it was amplified internationally, directly and indirectly. The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019, which nullified Article 370 and bifurcated the state into Union Territories, was advanced with the claim that these changes would enhance India’s counter-terrorism posture. It was argued that direct central control was vital for securing the region. Some even cited demonetization as a contributing factor in weakening terrorism financing. However, this narrative overlooks a critical reality: even when Article 370 was in force, the central government and its agencies were already managing the core aspects of countering cross-border terrorism. For instance, border security has always remained under the purview of the Union government. Thus, framing abrogation as a turning point in counter-terrorism is not only a simplification but also a potential distortion.
The risk here is twofold: domestically, such framing can breed misplaced complacency; internationally, it fosters an inconsistent narrative. For five years, the dominant claim has been that the abrogation improved the security situation. Now, if the argument pivots to emphasise persistent or even resurgent cross-border terrorism, it creates confusion before a global audience. The narrative must align with ground realities, namely, the enduring and evolving challenges to India’s security, as evidenced by continued infiltration across the Line of Control. Ironically, just a week before the Baisaran attack, Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Omar Abdullah urged the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) to use diplomatic channels to persuade countries like the US, UK, Australia, and the EU to revise or lift their travel advisories against Jammu and Kashmir. He argued that such a move would serve as the clearest, internationally recognised proof of the region’s improvement.
In response to the Pahalgam attack, on May 7, 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor. The airstrikes targeted terrorist camps across the Line of Control (LoC) and in Pakistani Punjab, signalling India’s resolve to combat terrorism. India released some of the names of five terrorists killed to underscore the operation’s precision. The international response has been cautious. While acknowledging India’s security concerns, the United States, EU, and Japan have urged restraint. China, which is now Pakistan’s prime weapons supplier, termed the strikes “regrettable” and called for stability. Russia reaffirmed support for India’s sovereignty and condemned terrorism in all forms. But the key question remains: will this prevent future attacks? The answer is no. Tactical strikes cannot dismantle the entrenched terrorist infrastructure. And in a scenario where the US is looking inward and reluctant to proactively ensure peace as it has done in previous India-Pakistan crises, one needs to factor in any strategy. The actions cannot ignore the impact on the population living in border regions and on India’s broader economic trajectory. At the time of writing this piece, both countries are on edge with aerial dogfights and exchanges of missiles and drones, particularly in border areas, thus raising the stakes between the two nuclear countries. Pakistan initiated heavy artillery shelling targeting civilian areas near the Line of Control, particularly in Poonch, which has resulted in the deaths of at least 16 civilians, including four children, and injured over 40 others. Along the India-Pakistan international border, especially in sectors like Jammu, Samba, Kathua, and parts of Punjab (like Ferozpur), there have been recurring instances of cross-border firing and drone incursions from Pakistan that have led to civilian injuries, displacement, and security concerns.
Global indifference
To sum up, no doubt, India’s counter-terrorism concerns, deeply rooted in hard evidence and lived experiences, continue to be met with global indifference, diplomatic ambivalence, or, at best, procedural sympathy. Mohammad Abdullah’s chilling confession and Ajmal Kasab’s brazen rampage are not isolated incidents. They reflect a persistent pattern of cross-border terror fueled by ideological indoctrination and logistical support. And yet, powerful acts of defiance like that of Kaka, the Gujjar Muslim who subdued a terrorist with nothing but a rope, are emblematic of an alternative narrative within India that often goes untold. These truths, visceral and grounded, deserve not just domestic recognition but global affirmation. However, the disconnect between India’s realities and international perception lies in a complex interplay of reactive diplomacy, narrative inconsistencies, procedural inertia in multilateral forums, and a failure to consistently communicate the human cost of terrorism.
To change this, India must recalibrate its approach, from episodic outrage to strategic storytelling, from reactive policy to proactive engagement. It must show the world not only the faces of those it has lost, but the courage of those who resist terror daily. Most importantly, it must harmonise its domestic narrative with international messaging by being grounded, shedding defensiveness and arbitrariness in favour of a confident assertion of fact and law. Only then can India ensure that the voices of victims and the bravery of bystanders like Kaka or Adil are not lost in the fog of diplomatic relativism, but heard clearly in the global court of conscience.
The author has nearly 25 years of experience tracking and working on terrorism-related issues, including in Jammu and Kashmir and at United Nations Headquarters, where he managed several programmes and chaired the Pillar I Working Group of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy under the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (now known as UNOCT).
Published – May 10, 2025 05:17 pm IST